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GuERRIERI

v.

the petition should be granted.
then filed:

SEv~RINI

[51 C.2d

The following opinion was

SHENK, .T., and SPENCE, ,J.-On petition for rehearing
vve are of the opinion that the modification of the original
opinion ordered
this court on denial of petition for re~
hearing does not adeq nately eure the defects pointed out in
the dissenting opinion and that the petition for rehearing
should be granted.

F. No. 19961.

In Bank.

Oct. 17, 1958.]

LEWIS GUERRIERI et al., Appellants, v. PHIL J.
SEVERINI et al., Respondents.
[1] Contracts- Breach- Anticipatory Breach.-The doctrine of
breach of contract by anticipatory repudiation is recognized.
[2] !d.-Breach-Anticipatory Breach.-An anticipatory breach
of contract occurs when one party positively repudiates the
contract by acts or statements indicating that he will not or
cannot substantially perform its essential terms.
[3] !d.-Breach-Anticipatory Breach.-Anticipatory breach must
appear only with the clearest terms of repudiation of the
obligation of the contract.
[4] Id.-Breach-Repudiation.-It is not in the power of one
party to a contract to discharge it by repudiating it.
[5] !d.-Breach-Effect of Rennnciation.-Assuming that a promisor's statement that he will not deliver the wine called for by
a contract of sale amounts to a positive repudiation of the
contract, it has the effect of giving the buyer or promisee the
right of election either to treat the declaration as an empty
threat and wait until the time for performance, or to act on
the declaration and treat it as a final assertion by the promisor
that he is no longer bound by the contract, and as a wrongful
renunciation of the contractual relation. If the promisee elects
to pursue the latter course, the declaration becomes a breach
of contract, excusing performance on his part and giving him
an immediate right to recover upon it as such; upon such
election the rights of the parties are regarded as then culmiSee Cal.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 245; Am.Jur., Contracts, § 391
et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1-3, 6] Contracts,§ 245; [4] Contracts,
§ 246; [5, 7~9] Contracts,§ 241; [10-12] Damages,§ 30.
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tlw ,·otllrndtwl rel11tion ('Cil~<'~
til<' pnrpos(• ol' ,,wintaining· nn ndimt !'or dnntngt·~.

for

Breach-- Anticipatory Breach.----Am(mg othN
for appli<'Htion of the doetrillc of breneh by antieip~1tory
1·t•pudiation are that the repudiatPe treat the repudiation as a
IJrendt and that there be no retraction of the repudiation h~·
repudio1tor prior to the time for perfOI'IlHlll<'(' ot· prior
(p
df'trinH•ntal ehnnge in position
the repudiatee in
thereon.
7b] !d.-Breach-Effect of Renunciation.---\VlH·rP a J!l'otnisot·'s
;;taleuJPnt that he would not deliver the witw called for by a
eoutrad of sale was not aceepted or aet.Pd on as an :mi.iciparepudiation of tlw contract by the prowisee at that time,
the promisee did not then eleet to treat the repudiation as
n breach of contnwt, but when the promisee materially changed
his position about a month later by purchasing a winery in
order to obtain the quality and quantity of wiHPoi HPPded, he
exf'reised his Plection to treat the repudiation as a breaeh of
tl1e contmet of sale; the fad that the protuis(•e did not make
paynwnt in full within 48 hours as providPd iu the contract
was immaterial in viev; of sueh facts.
!d.-Breach- Effect of Renunciation.--1\:fanifestation by Uw
injurPd party of a purpose to allow or require performance
by thP promisor in spite of repudiation by him does not
nullify its effect as a breach, or prevent it from excusing perfonnance of conditions and diseharging the duty to n,nder a
rPturn performanee.
r9J !d.-Breach-Rights and Duties of Injured Party.-After a
promisor has statPd that he would not deliver the wine called
for by a contract of sale, the promisee may not be re<JUired
to buy immediately, within the hour, wines of lesser quality
than that contracted for and which had previous!~· been rejeeted by him, since this would deprive the promisee of his
election to treat the repudiation as a breach or continue to
stand on the contract and would force him to Hecept the
rqmdiatiou as a breach of contract.
[10] Damages-Mitigation of Loss.-'fhe extent o£ the duty to
winimize damages is to use ordinary care and diligence to
prevent the enhancement of damages, and the injured party
need not go to extraordinary or unusual length to minimize
tlatnages.
!d.-Mitigation of Loss.-'l'he duty to minimize damages does
not rPquire an injured person to do what is unreasonable or
impradieable.

[JO] Duty to mitigate damages, note, 81 A.L.R. 282.
Cal.Jur.2d, Damages, § 112; Am.Jur., Damages, § 192.

See also
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[121 !d.-Mitigation of Loss.- ~ l n :m
dmnag-cs fur
hn·m-h of' a eontnwt ['or sale of wim·. it would lw ll!ln·asnnable
nd impradieable to
wilhin
hour of the
hrench by anticipatory
hac;cd on his
statement that he would not deliver the wine called for b,\'
the eoutrac:t, to buy unfinished wine infel'ior in
lwd previously hcen rejected hy pbintif'Cs, in ordn to
ihe damages enused
defendant's bread1.

APPEAL from a judgment of the
Strother P. 'Walton, ,Judge.
tions.

Court of Presno
Heversed \Yith direc-

Action for damages for breach of contract for sale of wine.
,Judgment for defendants reversed with directions.
vVild, Christensen, Barnard & 'Wild, 'William It. Manson
and Hobert ::\1. Barnard for Appellants.
James Hobert 1\ielsen, Tener \V Nielsen and Harold V.
'l'hompson for Hespondents.
CAH'l'EH, ,J.---Plaintitrs, l.Jewis Guenieri, and his eopartners in the Sm1ta Fe Vintage Company, brought an aetion
for damages for the breaeh of a eoutraet for the sale of approximately 200,000 gallons of wine against defendant, Phil J.
SeYerini. In that ac:tion the trial eourt found that there was
no eontraet entered into bet\Ycen the parties. On appeal the
judgment ''"as reyersed aud a uew trial was ordered. ( Uucr] i32 Cal.App.2d 269 [281 P.2d 879].)
Ticri v.
At the seeond trial, the court found that there was a valid
written eolltract between the parties which had been breaehed
by clefenc1ant Severini but that plaintiff,; had suffered no
damage thereby.
Plaiutiffc: here contend that eertain findings of the trial
eonl't are unsupported by the evidenee. These findings will
be diseussed separately hereafter.
Plaintiffs who are eopartners are the owners of the Santa Pe
Vintage Company-which engages in the business of producing,
buying·, bottling and marketing wine. Their principal plaee
of business is in IJOS Angeles. Defendant and his wife were
the owners of the Severini Winery and Distillery. Pritz Kyer
was an i nclependeut wine broker doing business in Presno
and in the ease at bar aeted as agent for both plaintiffs and
defendant. On approximately March 27, 1953, Kyer went

SEYERINI
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from the Santa
(lefendant 's wi11e and
per gallon therefor. Defenclnnt w:eepted
eollllllHIJ ientcl1 the aeceptanee
of business in IJos
pn']Hll'ed a written doeument whieh
on either :I\fan,h 80tl1 m· :nst. 1
that
s1n·cl \vines wi·re ":::\old to Santa Fe Viu tngl3 Cu." and
of each t.vrw of :sweet wine involn't1. Tlw
state1l to be :30 ee11ts per gallon and it "inlS provided
1ilat "Xll of the alJOYl: wine to be out
August 1, 19;):3.'"
: Seyerini \\'illery & Distiller.1· by Phil .J.
) . " 'l'lw eonlraet was dated Ma l'1·h 27, Hl58,
proYide.I for "Cash foe Butire Amount lmOu the original ap1wal of this case the eourt noted that the
for cash payment "immediately" meant "ensh for
ire amount within 48 hours " 2 ( 132 Cal. A pp.2d 2GD, 278 I
after Severini had signed the l'Ontrad on 1\Iareh 80th
lst Kyer talked to Cuerrieri in Los i\_ngeles on the teleplimw and at Gnerrieri 's suggestion immediately mailed the
(•onlraet to him tbere. In the conversation Kyer told
tH•nieri that Sevl)rini wanted him to send someone to gauge
thrJ wine in the tanks at the wiueJ'.)T but Guerrieri said he did
th n k it was !Jeeessal'Y 1wd that he would take Severini's
as to tbe qnantity. Approximately one hour aftnr
::;,.\·erini had signed the eontnwt and it had been mailed to
( ;uenieri ill Los
Sr·Yel'ini r•alled Kyer on the teleand told him that due to some domestie diffieu1ties he
1vith his wiJe a restraining order had been placed
his diei]JOsition of the wine and that he would be unable
<leliYeJ' iL K;.'er testified that he told Severini that the
order harl alreac1,v been mailed to plaintiff iu Los
.At the seeond trial Severini admitted that at the
trial, when informed that the writtell signed ordet· had
l>een t;ent to Guerrieri, he had said "\Yell, if that's
0

'Se-verini t ec;ti fkd t1H1t he signed the order on March 27th. Defendant's
( pp. 10 :J)i(! J :ll
to concede that this is erroneous and the
on th.~ fir>>!
states that the contract was signed
the :lOth or ;; lot
!n ll,j,; t·mmcction it :.;],ould he notc<l that tl1e n·portcl"'s transedpt on
'<c-<·mlf1 trial is far from satisfadory and thr~ reeorcl shows the difJithc JliHties nnd witnesses had in recalling the events which occurred
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the case, that's all that can be done. \Ve 'll have to go through
with it. "a
\Vhen
called Guerrie ·i on the telephone on Mard1 30th
or 31st to tell him that fewrini had told him he would be
unable to deliver the winJ Gu,rricri told him "you ;just have
to
this wine because. I want it. I tested and cheeked it
and it is just the thing that we need.''
The trial court, aft ~r finding (III) that the parties had
entered into a bindiwi'. valid and enforceable contraet "evidenced by a memorandum in writing, signed by the defendant" on March 27, 1953, found (V):
'' 'J'hat it was a term and condition of said contract that
the plaintiffs werr' to have the wine tanks guaged at the
Severini \Vinery and Distillery premises to determine the
cxaet gallonage l ought under the aforesaid contract within
forty-eight hour; of its execution, and that payment for the
entire gallonage so bought was to be made by the plaintiff in
cash for the entire amount immediately.''
'l'he record is uncontradicted that the gauging of the wine
was no part of the contract; that which party was to do the
gauging was never agreed on by the parties at any time. 4 In
Finding VII the trial court found that the plaintiffs had not
performed any of the terms, conditions and things on their
part to be ''done and performed under the said agreement,
and specifically the plaintiffs did not guagc the said tanks
of wine in accordance with the aforesaid contract, nor did
they tender payment to the plaintiff [defendant] in accordance with its terms." It is uncontradicted that plaintiffs were
at all times ready, able and willing to pay for the wine.
In Finding VI, it appears "That on March 27, 1956 [1953],
subsequent to the execution of the aforesaid contract, and
within t>venty-four hours thereafter, the defendant, Phil J.
Severini, t(nconclit1:onally repudiated the contract and notified
the plaintiffs that he would not deliver the wine in accordance
with the said contract. That the refusal of the defendant to
deliver the wine constituted a breach of the aforesaid eontract." (Emphasis added.)
The record is uncontradicted that while the contract was
<latt'd Mareh 27, 1953, it was actually signed on either Mareh
80th or 31st, H153, and that approximately one hour after
"This same statement also appears in the first opinion on appeal (l 32
Cal.App.2d 269, 273).
"rhis also appears in the first opinion on appeal (132 Cal.App.2d 269,
272).
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that he would
as has been hereto-

would "have to get" it
that at times suhselpient to
and SeYeri ni tried
of at least half of the wine which
the contract. 11. letter· from Kyer
29, 1953, which was introduced and
as an
stated that "Phil [Severini] tells me
the wine he offered to
you is his exact half and rcpreall
the winery with the exception
of the wines and the quantiis a statenwnt that the total gallonage is 88,000
; that it was ready io ship, that Severini "would like
for you to draw at least three truck loads a week until it is
out''; and the manner in which payment should be made.
iR also a statement in the letter that ''I did overlook
that he [Severini] also told me that in case he
a relrase from his wife on the second half that you would
first opportunity to lmy it." 'l'he letter contains
mention of the price per gallon.
There is also in the record as an exhibit, a letter to Kycr
from L. Kenneth
as ''Attorney for Severini Winery &
' dated April
1953, in ·whieh he refers to his
c-lient's "offrr" of lYLm:h 27th to sell 200,000 gallons of wine
o the Santa Fe Vintag-l~ Company of Los Angeles and stating
i hat since this "offer" has never been accepted by plaintiff's
(·ompany "said offer is hereby withdrawn."
The reeon1 shows that with respeet to the negotiations conthe 88,000 g-allons of wine whieh Severini represented
be 0110-haH of the wine on hand at his winery, Guerrieri
d''mkmc1e(1 to see Rrverini 's GoYernment F'orm 702 as evidence
i hat t11co
emt:,tit nted one-half of the wiue in the
a government inYentory of the
wine in a
Rcoverini refused to show him the Form 702.
Ou April 29, 1953, plaintiffs purchased the Morello \Vinery
order to get the quantity and quality of wine they desired.
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of sueh wine.
'fhe doctrine of breach of a contraet
in this state
Ins.
23 Cal.2cl 94, 104
) . [2] "An
breach of contract occurs on the part of one of
to the instrument when he
acts or statements
or cannot
essential terms thereof. . . . ''
v. East Side
etc.
6
367
P.2d
.) [3] '
breach must appear only
with the clearest terms of
of the obligation of the
contract.
v. District Bond Co., 5 Cal.App.2d 738
[43 P.2d
; Golcl Jllin. & "Water Co. v. Swine1·ton, 23 Cal.
2d 19 [142 P.2d
4 Cal..Jur.Supp. 197.)" (Hertz Driv-UrInc. v.
Distilleries Corp., 119 Cal.App.
2d 754, 760 [260 P.2d 93].)
[4] Even if we assume that Severini's statement to Kyer
that he would not deliver the wine, which it will be recalled
was followed by the statement that "we'll have to go through
with it,'' amounted to that
repudiation in the ''clearest terms" required
the law, it is not within the power of
one party to a contract to discharge it by repudiating it.
(iliain St. etc. Co. v. Los Angeles Traction Co., 129 Cal. 301,
306 [61 P. 937]; Atkinson v. District Bond Co., 5 Cal.App.2d
738 [43 P.2d 867] ;
Gold & Copper Co. v. lf1arks, 185
Cal. 386 [197 P. H4] ; Rchart v. Klossner, 48 Cal.App.2d 46,
51 [119 P.2d
; Wilton v. Clarke, 27 Cal.App.2d 1, 4 [80
P.2d 141].)
[5] If >Ve assume that Severini's statement amounted to
a posi_tive repudiation of the contract entered into by him to
sell to plaintiffs 20b,OOO gallons of wine, it had the effect of
giving the buyer, or promisee, Guerrieri, the right of election
either to treat the declaration as an empty threat and to wait
until the time for performance arrived, or to act upon the
declaration and treat it as a final assertion by Severini that
he was no longer bound by the contract, and as a wrongful
remmciation of the contraetual relation into which he had
entered. "H he cleds to pursue the latter ronrse, it lJeeomes
a b1·ea(·h of
cxeusing
on his part and
him an immediate right to recover 11pon it as such.
Upon :smh elediou the rights of the parties are to be regarded
as then culminating, and the contractual relation ceases to
exist, except for the purpose of maintaining an action for

Co. v.
added.)
ud SN' A /;ralwm
57 Ca1.App.2d 973. D78 r 1;3;) P.2d
TAd. v. Etll
44
114, 117
P.2d
[7a] \Vlwn l he unem1i nHlid(•d fads shown l>y the reeonl
considered in the li~~ht of the appl ieabl e hrw ns hcl'ctofore
sci fot·th, it appears that ·while Severini',.; Rtatemcnt on the
'30th or :llst of 1\Tarch that he would not deliver the wine, may
5
considered as au antieipatory repudiation of' the
or aeted upoJJ, as ~meh by
at that time. In other \YOrds, Guerrieri did Hot
then eleet to treat the repudiation as a brea(•h of' the eontraet.
But ·when Guerrieri materially c-hanged hifl position 011 AIJril
1
purehasing the 1\rorrllo W incry in order to
obtain the quantity and quality of ·wines neec1cd
the Santa
, he exercised his eleelion to treat the
as n breach of the eontract of sale.
'l'lle faet that Guerrieri did not make payment ill full within
48 bonrs as provided in the contract is, under the facts here
immaterial. ( Gue1-ricri v.
132 Cal.App.2d
273 [281 P.2d 879]; Atkinson v. District Bond Co., G Cal.
74;) [43 P.2d 8G7]; Fisher v. Chaffee, 4D Cal.
A pp.2d fJ7, 100 [121 P .2d 51].) [8] As stated in seetion 320
the Restatement of Contracts: "1\Ia11ifcstation by thro inpady of a purpose to allow or to require
the promisor iu spite of repudiation by him, does not
that Severini's statement on 'Marcl1 30th or 31st
not • •
mwquivoutl and absolute" within the Tn!e set forth in
Atkinson v.
Bond Co., 5 C<.I.App.2d
748
P.2d 8G7], and
Salot v.
F>7 Cal.App.:?d 3.)2,
P.~d 9:JG].
The
letter written bv
attonwy on April 24,
appears to con·
stitute the repudiation.

"Comment:
may be nullified
''a. Although the effect of
.. it operates until so nullified not
as a breaeh but as
a continuing excuse of conditions ..
justification of the promisee's failure
a return
promise . . . even though the
has indieated a willingness to forgive the repudiation.'' (See also Civ.
§ 1440.)
It appears, therefore, that F'iuding
as heretofore set
forth, is not supported by the evidence.
F'inding VIII is "That at the time of the defendant's
refusal to deliver and within
hours
the defendant's breach of the said eontract, there was available for purchase on the open market at Fresno, California, assorted
sweet wines in sufficient quantities and of a like quality as
that contracted for at an identical price per gallon.
"That the plaintiffs knew of the availability, but that they
unjustifiably refusecl to purchase the same. That if plaintiffs
had purchased the wine so offered to them, they would have
suffered no damage whatsoever
reason of the defendant's
refusal to deliver the wine under the aforesaid contract.''
(Emphasis added.)
[9] 'rhe record shows that prior to Guerrieri's purchase
of the Severini wine he had examined samples of not only the
wine referred to in Finding VIII, but other wines as well;
that he had his winemaker examine them for aleohol sugars
and quality. Guerrieri testified that '"rhe result of that
examination [of the Severini wines] \Yas that they were very
good wines. Some of them, especially the Muscat and Angeliea,
higher in balling sugar, which made them more valuable wines
than the aleohol outside of the Angelica, which was 18.8 per
cent"; that samples of other wines had been sent to him and
rejected by him. The record shows that on March 30th or 31st
when the contract was signed by Severini there was available
a lot of 225,000 gallons of tmfinished, wine which was one of
the wines which had been previously rejceted
Guerrieri;
that this wine was sold to a third person later in the day on
March 30th or 31st after Guerrieri had been told of Severini's
statement that he would not deliver the wine contracted for.
The evidence is uncontradicted that this so-called available
wine was unfinished wine, whereas the Severini wine was
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in either aleohol or sugar
and that the Severini wine

and as
ntiffs were rc<]nired, 011 the
to
immediately,
than that contracted

a~ a hreavh or continue to staud on the contract
would be
him to ac:erpt the n•pndiation as a breaeh
(·ontrar:t in violation or the rnles of law heretofore set forth.
testified that on or about April17, 1953, he purchased
/4,0(1()
of WillE' for CJUC'l'l'il'ri at 4() <'PIItS per gallon;
file >vill(' iu the 1\IorPllo \Vinery purehased hy Guerrieri
\\·a~ prieeclnt 421/~ c:rnts fH'r gallon. It apfrom ilu• l'l'\'Ort1 ihat ou approxilllately .April 7th or 8th,
llH• San ,J o~1qniH Yall(·y exprrirneed an unseasonable frost
id1 resulted in the greatly inereased prices of the o::ame type
'l'here is evidence i.u the reeonl that after the frost
to that whir·h Sewr.ini had agreed to
and as high in sugar content was selling for
per
Sedion 1787, subdivisionr-: 1, 2 and 3, of the Civil Code provide · · ( 1! \YlH'l'l' tlll' property ill the goorls has not passecl
ilw
. an([ the seller \ITOl1itl'ni1~' 11eglt':·ts or r"fnses to
deliv0r the goods, the huyer may maintain an aetion against
selkr for d<llll<lg·es for lWIId('liver)·.
"
't'he measure of
is the loss direetly and
natm:a
resulting in the onliHary cour:-;c of events, from the
seller's hreac·h of eontrad.
' (a) \Ylwre there is a11 ayailabh' rnark<'i for the goods in
tlu: mca.mrc
damages, in tlw abseuee of speeial
" damages of a l!'n•ater
!J, tween ill coJiinwt
awl the
at the time ot times when
"Mu~cnt wine is made of 100 por cent nmscat grapes while muscatel is
hlclHl of muscat and other grapes.
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have been
or, if no time
then at the time of the re(~tsal to deliver."
It is defendant's
that the
any time after the
; that no
or times, were specified
even
the contraet provided that all of the
\\·inc mn;;t he taken from the
1, 1953. It is
dr~fcudant
that there was no
repudiation
in the case at bar; that an actual breach took
on l\Iarch
80th o;· :n,.,t. 1
and that the
should be measured
as of that time. From what we have heretofore
it is
obvious that defendant's argument is without merit inasmuch
as h1• <·otdd IWL by repmliatlng the eontraet, foree the bnyer
into
the
as a breaeh of eontract. [7b] 1t
appears to us that the aetual bread1 took
on J\pril 29,
elected to treat the rPpudiation as a
1953, when the
breaeh b)' materially dmnging his position in buying the
Morello Winery in order to obtain the quantity and quality
of \Yine neeessary to fulfill his needs and io rt>plaee that \Yhieh
defendant had agreed to selP Plaintiffs argue in their opening brief (p. 13) that
were forced to pay a 9 cents increase
per gallon over the contract priee in their purchase of replacement wine. The record shows that the wine at the Morello
\Vinery was 42% cents per gallon unfinished; that finishing
would eost from
cents to 2Y2 cents per gallon. In this connection it should be noted that plaintiffs' complaint alleges that
they have been damaged in the sum of $78,000. 'l'his appears
to be a typographieal error inasmuch as they correctly emnpute the sum (according to their figures in their opening brief)
as $18,000.
Defendant contends that plaintiffs had a duty to mitigate
damages by accepting the lot of wine which was available
for a short time after defendant's repudiation on March 30th
or 31st. Relianee is placed on the case of Las Palmas etc. Distillery v. Garrett & Co., 167 CaL 397, 400 [139 P. 1077],
wherein it was held that defendant had not been damaged
since it could have purchased large quantities of wine of the
"same l{ind, quality, and quantity as it daimed was to be furnishefl and sold by plaintiff, at
not
excess of the
7
It Rhould be noted here that while plaintiffs'
alleges that
defendant noti!ied plaintiffs that
would not
the wines on
there is no evidence in
reeord to substantiate this date
as
the
'l'he dates of the various conversations
and correspondence
been lwretoforc set forth and are uncontradicted.
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This
in
which \Yas never done.
fHlau"'"'u.r pointed out that ther'" was more than snffi,~ient cviin the record to
the trial court's determinations.
case under consideration there is no evidence in the
to show that the "same kind,
and quantity"
of wine was available for plaintiffs to
With respect to plaintiffs' duty to mitigate damages,
rule is that '' 'l'he duty to minimize damages is predicated
the statutory rule that a person is required to use reasoncare to prevent an unwarranted piling up of damages.
extent of the duty is to use ordinary care and diligence
the enhancement of damages, and the duty does
not extend to the necessity of going to extraordinary or unusual lengths to minimize damages. (Jcgen v. Berger, 77 Cal.
1 [174 P.2d 489] ; Baker v. Borello, 136 Cal. 160
P. 591]; Ash v. Soo Sing Lung, 177 Cal. 356 [170 P .
. ) " (Scott's V. F. Exch. v. Growers Refrigeration Co.,
81 Cal.App.2d 437, 451 [184 P.2d 183].) [11] All(l "The
to minimize damages does not require an injured person to do what is unreasonable or impracticable . . . . " ( Valtncia v. Shell Oil Co., 23 Cal.2d 840, 846 [147 P.2d 558] .)
see: Crag Lumbct· Co. v. Crofoot, 144 Cal.App.2d 755,
780 [301 P.2d 952]; Johnson v. Comptoir etc. D'Exportation,
135 Cal.App.2d 683, 689 [288 P.2d 151]; Qnesto v. Dorado,
136 CaL\.pp.2d 332, 336 [288 P.2d 529] ; Gagne v. Bertran,
48 Cal.2d 481, 491 [275 P.2d 15] .) [12] It would be unreasonable and impracticable under the facts here presented
to require plaintiffs, within an hour of the breach by anticiparepudiation by Severini, to buy unfinished \Vine inferior
quality which had previously been rejected by them, in
order to mitigate the damages caused by defendant's breach.
It is our conclusion that the judgment should be reversed
with directions to the trial court to retry the canso on the sole
issue of the amount of damages suffered by plaintiffs in reF"•'c'us the wine covered by the contract breached by defendSeverini.
The judgment is reversed with directions to retry the case
on the sole issue of damages.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, .J., Spence, J.,
and McComb, J., concurred.

